

built unless there is security to prevent attacks on contractors and aid workers and to prevent sabotage to the projects themselves. We are fortunate to have a superb military there to provide that kind of security. But that is what the Defense Department should be doing, providing the security but not trying to oversee foreign aid projects. That is not what they are trained to do.

It is unfair to our men and women in the military to ask them to do that. It was a mistake in the first place when we asked them to do it. We should not repeat that. Let us not ask the Department of Defense to suddenly become the State Department, AID, and the general dispenser of foreign aid. They are so well trained to do the things they do. Let those who are trained to handle foreign aid and the projects of reconstruction be there.

It is also worth noting, when you look at the civil affairs units in the Defense Department, almost all of them are composed of National Guard and Reserve units. Ironically, to the extent you are going to use the military for the nation building we are doing in Iraq—we are doing nation building in Afghanistan, and Lord knows where else—these are the men and women in uniform who are best equipped for the nation building we are doing in Iraq.

So we either have to keep these National Guard and Reserve forces in Iraq indefinitely—and I think the majority of the Members of both parties here do not want to see that happen—or we have to get the State Department and USAID more involved in doing nation building. I favor the latter approach. That is what my amendment would do.

I do not think we should continue to rely on these National Guard and Reserve units to do the long-term development work that should be done by others. Let that be done by the Department of State and AID, and let the Department of Defense provide the security for those who are doing the reconstruction in Iraq.

Some might ask if the Secretary of State wants that authority, given what a thankless job it is becoming in Iraq. I do not know. If he gets the authority, I will offer him not congratulations but condolences.

I see my dear friend.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, might I answer my colleague's very insightful question as to what the Secretary of State has in mind.

I have just been in consultation with his office, upon learning of my distinguished colleague's amendment. Very shortly there will be a written communication coming to the leadership of the Senate expressing, without any equivocation, that he feels strongly that the Department of State, at this time, should not be given the responsibility. But there will come a time, I say to my distinguished colleague—an appropriate time, and perhaps without further interruption to your opening remarks—I could engage the Senator in

a colloquy to discuss perhaps an alternative measure at some future time.

Basically, it would be after the Iraqi Government is in place and the United States would, at that time, indicate an individual to become the U.S. Ambassador, at which time there could be an orderly transition from the Department of Defense to the Department of State.

My concern, I say to my friend, is that it has taken Ambassador Bremer some 3 months now to gain the momentum he has. We have a critical issue before this body at the very moment of whether or not the additional funds will hopefully immediately be forthcoming. That decision will be finally made next week. I strongly support it, to continue that momentum. A shift at this time would result in loss of momentum.

I conclude my few remarks at this moment by saying, throughout the testimony and private discussions with Ambassador Bremer, which I am sure my colleague from Vermont has had, he has constantly said that the danger to the coalition forces—that danger being indelibly impressed on us every day with the announcement of a loss or an injury to members of the uniformed services, and indeed others—David Kay is, at this moment, before committees of the Congress. In conversations with me, he has expressed the danger to his operation daily by their transit down these motorways and otherwise.

The direct correlation of reducing the danger to our troops, to the Iraqi special survey group headed by David Kay, and to others performing NGO operations—this whole panoply of people—there is a direct correlation between the speed and the momentum that the Bremer operation has brought up to replace the infrastructure and the lessening of the personal risks to individuals.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the senior Senator from Virginia is not only one of the best friends I have in this place, and has been for the years that we have served together, but I also know he is one of the hardest working Members of the Senate.

As I mentioned earlier in my opening statement, I am not suggesting for a minute that Ambassador Bremer, for whom I have high regard, be replaced. I am simply saying that it is not a question of whether the Secretary of State should take this now or later; the fact is, this is his job. He should have been doing it from the beginning. We are not changing horses in midstream.

Incidentally, speaking of Mr. Kay and others, I also stated, prior to the Senator from Virginia coming to the floor, that, of course, the military would have to stay and provide the security so these people can continue to work. I am just saying, insofar as we are doing nation building, let it be done by the State Department, as we always have, and not think that somehow we can go solely as a military au-

thority and then have this country suddenly, one day, become a democratic nation, and only then will we bring in the State Department to give aid.

I have looked at the plan. The plan said it was to give the Iraqi people the opportunity to realize President Bush's vision. We may want to ask them if that is exactly the vision they want. But be that as it may, this is not changing horses in midstream. We are getting on the right horse, in fact, the horse that has taken us across the stream for the last 50 years.

Every major postwar reconstruction effort since the Marshall plan has been under the auspices of the Secretary of State, not the Secretary of Defense: Afghanistan, Kosovo, East Timor, Bosnia, Cambodia. Even during the middle of the Vietnam war, economic aid was handled by AID.

I am thinking of an article on July 24, referring to an assessment by outside experts, commissioned by the Pentagon, who warned that the window of opportunity for postwar success is closing. The Philadelphia Inquirer reported that: After initial deals for reconstruction stalled, it was time for plan B but there was no plan B.

I would hope the plan B that was written on July 23 is not it. I have a plan B. It is called the Secretary of State. Put the Department of State in charge of the reconstruction. Not the military part, of course. The military is going to be there for some substantial period of time—we know this—but allow them to do the things they are good at. They are not trained, nor should they be, to become a governing power, to become nation builders.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could probe my colleague, as I read this, it states very clearly:

*Provided further,* That beginning not later than 60 days after enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority shall report to and be under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State.

As I indicated, the Secretary is very much opposed to this amendment. We will very shortly have that evidence before the Senate. But it is clear from the reading of this that the \$21 billion which is before this body right now as a part of the 87—and it remains a part; that issue has been addressed—would now be transferred to the Department of State for, frankly, writing all the checks, working on the allocation of priorities, the coordination with the military structure under the Secretary of Defense and General Abizaid, the CENTCOM commander. The whole thing is lifted and put under the State Department in 60 days after this, should it be enacted. Am I not correct?

Mr. LEAHY. No, the Senator is not correct. The implication is that somehow my amendment would put everything under the State Department. We are being asked to provide over \$80 billion. Roughly three-quarters of that goes to the Department of Defense. Nobody is asking anybody but the Department of Defense to handle it. We are